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Abstract
Behind the variable minutae of offences and penalties controlling the use of illicit drugs (such as the
opiates, cocaine, and marijuana) around the world, there is a remarkable sameness of character and
ferocity. In the Philippines and Jamaica, in Malaysia and Singapore, and in some of the United States,
drug trafficking may be punishable by death. In the several States of Australia, the trafficking of a
"commercial quantity" of a drug may typically lead to a penalty of 25 years' imprisonment and in addition
a fine of up to $250,000. In some jurisdictions the guilty are liable to $500,000 fines and to life
imprisonment. In Canada likewise, and in the United Kingdom, trafficking in a narcotic drug or even
possession for that purpose are punishable by life imprisonment. As Robert Solomon and S.J. Usprich
have argued in the Canadian context, the Narcotic Control Act (Can.) and its many analogues are
extraordinary, not simply due to the severity of particular provisions but because so many exceptional
devices are therein harnessed together. Other laws also provide for harsh penalties; for mandatory
sentencing; for a reverse onus of proof, requiring defendants to prove their innocence; for expanded
police powers of search and seizure: but only in 'drug' laws do all these measures coalesce. The result is
that modern drug laws around the world are a collection of extravagances, an expression of fury in
legislative form.
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THE SEMIOTICS OF THE
TITLE:
A COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS OF DRUG LEGISLATION
Desmond Manderson

INTRODUCTION
ehind .the variable ~inutae of offences and penalties controlling
the use of illicit drugs (such as the opiates, cocaine, and
marijuana) around the world, there is a remarkable sameness of
character and ferocity. In the Philippines and Jamaica, in Malaysia and
Singapore, and in some of the United States, drug trafficking may be
punishable by death. In the several States of Australia, the trafficking of a
"commercial quantity" of a drug may typically lead to a penalty of 25 years'
imprisonment and in addition a fme of up to $250,000. In some jurisdictions
the guilty are liable to $500,000 fmes and to life imprisonment. l In Canada
likewise, and in the United Kingdom, trafficking in a narcotic drug or even
possession for that purpose are punishable by life imprisonment. As Robert
Solomon and SJ. Usprich have argued in the Canadian context, the Narcotic
Control Act (Can.) and its many analogues are extraordinary, not simply due
to the severity of particular provisions but because so many exceptional
devices are therein harnessed together. Other laws also provide for harsh
penalties; for mandatory sentencing; for a reverse onus of proof, requiring
defendants to prove their innocence; for expanded police powers of search
and seizure: but only in 'drug' laws do all these measures coalesce. 2 The
result is that modem drug laws around the world are a collection of
extravagances, an expression of fury in legislative form.
Despite this consistency, across jurisdictions and over time/ it is
important to recognize that the reasons for the enactment of drug legislation
have not, of course, remained static. At different times, vastly different
purposes and priorities have led to similarly oppressive laws. It is not the
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reasons given for drug laws, or the beliefs of the evil or harm which 'drugs'
are said to cause, which have remained constant for over a century; far from
it. Rather, it is simply the consistent ferocity of the social response. An
awareness of this truth - that drug laws around the world and over time
have shared not a certain logic, misguided perhaps but nevertheless
amenable to reason, but instead a visceral hatred expressed in legislative
form - will lead us in the right direction: towards addressing the emotions
and symbolism which drug use conjures up in the community, and not the
transient reasons advanced for its suppression.
To pursue this point - to demonstrate more fully bow the focus and
values of drug legislation have changed markedly over time even as the
fierceness of legislative response has found parallels around the world - I
develop an argument in comparative history, focusing on drug laws enacted
in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and, to some extent, the U.S.A..
First, I highlight how the style of drug laws has changed over time. Second,
and in greater depth, I draw attention to the way in which the focus of drug
laws and the reasons for their enactment have also varied dramatically.
I tell a story, then, about the development of drug legislation around the
world. But this narrative does not proceed by means of a traditional historical
analysis. Rather, my argument takes a semiotic approach to the question,
focusing on the connotations and implications of particular key words in the
history of drug laws, words which recur time and time again in a variety of
jurisdictions at a specific historical moment. What are the key words in the
changing rhetoric of drug laws, I ask, and what did they symbolize? It is the
marshalling of this semfutic technique which provides my argument with
much of its interest and novelty.
Semiotics means different things to different people. At times it is
undoubtedly true that the field of legal semiotics has been overtaken by a
systematizing ¢lpulse in which the scientific aspirations of semiotics have
held sway. Bernard Jackson, for example, attempts the complex task of the
categorization of legal tropes, defining with considerable precision and care
a structure of signification and the ways in which law uses language. The
same can be said of some of the works of Roberta Kevelson who has
attempted to apply to legal materials the difficult semiotic theories of Clmrles
Peirce, with their complex arrangement of orders and classes of signs. 4
Nevertheless, this treats the law as an interior monologue: linguistic signs
confront linguistic signs and explain themselves by themselves. As Peirce
insisted, this semiosis - a process by which signs refer to other signs - is
"unlimited". Likewise according to Umberto Eca, "Semiosis explains itself
by itself ... This continual circularity is the normal condition of
signification", the construction of a self-referential "rhizome-like labyrinth"s
Certainly, absent a phenomonological understanding, all meaning is given to
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us through signs which point to a reality not immediately present. But here
there is a different kind of circularity at work, characteristic of legal
fOImalism. In this kind of semiotics, law is not treated as referring to a wider
social symbolism, or as a creator or mediator of those symbols, but rather a~
a system of signs and of language use internal to itself. 6
But elsewhere, a broader approach to the inter-relationship of law and
semiotics has been taken. Notwithstanding her own predeliction for a
Peircean framework, the three volumes of Law and Semiotics edited by
Kevelson showcase a remarkable eclecticism of approach and mien. The
articles collected therein explore not only the symbolic referents of words to
words, but everything from the function of the design of shopping malls to
the architecture of the courts.' The signs which laws express are here clearly
not merely treated as abstract signifiers of nOlTIlS and values, but of a more
labyrinthine interaction between popular, social, and legal symbols.
In a number of valuable books and articles Peter Goodrich, in particular,
has explored the ways in which the calculated illogicality of legal fonns such
as the writ and subpoena, and th,e arcane formulre of legal language in
general, possess a structural meaning beyond that of the words they use.
Taking a semiot:Jc approach to the languages of law, he sees symbolic
communication not only in what is said, but in the kind of things that are
said, and in the manner of their saying. 1i On this analysis, it is the feel and
look of the legal words, and books, and forms, which has symbolic import.
Semiotics is here a species of aesthetics. Indeed the two undoubtedly have
much in common. Without the ability to recognize that our understanding of
a word (of a law) extends, far beyond its literal meaning to a whole realm of
subtle connotations, we could not go beyond a rational and instrumentalist
account of law; and without the appreciation that words and acts do notcannot - simply 'stand for themselves' but rather symbolize other things,
themselves signs of other things in a vast chain of cultural associations and
resonances, we could not begin to appreciate how a legal text can have a
visual, metaphorical, emotional significance. Thus both this kind of
semiotics and aesthetics emphasize the pervasive influence of symbolism
over every aspect of our lives, and demonstrates an appreciation of the subtle
intricacies of linguistic connotation in the formation of that symbolism.
Adopting this flexible semiotic methodology, I therefore focus on the
meaning and implications of key words in the history of intemational drug
regulation. Distinct patterns of constancy and change emerge, illustrating the
kind of insight that a semiotic approach provides through its sensitivity to
linguistic subtelty. We [rod important aspects of the history of drug laws
encapsulated in a few words and placed into sharp focus. And what this
linguistic archaeology reveals is that drug laws, understood as a consistent
international phenomenon, have varied over time in their rationale, their
1
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concerns, and their style. Through a semiotic analysis, sensitive to the sound
and character of the language used in drug laws, we can clearly appreciate
both its coherence across jurisdictional space as well as its evanescence over
time.
Moreover, as I have noted, the anger these laws express has remained
remarkably constant. Difference beneath sameness, then, and sameness
beneath difference. Given these two points, I suggest that we need to look
elsewhere to explain this coherence of temper - to our aesthetic reactions to
the drugs themselves, perhaps, and to the emotion which drug use generates.
Not as a product of reason but of feeling, therefore, have drug laws been born
and grown; not in response to the voice of the mind but of the senses have
they shown themselves so impervious to refOIm.

THE SOUND AND WEIGHT OF DRUG LAWS
Since the fIrst laws prohibited the possession of 'opium suitable for
smoking' around the turn of the century - in parts of the United States and
in Australia frrst, then in Canada and later still in the United Kingdom9 - the
style and detail of these laws have undergone considerable change. But
baldly and with almost biblical simplicity, the first laws in these jurisdictions
established a precedent which has not been questioned since. This is the
paradigm of the style they adopt:

1.

This Act may be cited as the Opiwn Smoking Prohibition Act
1905 ...

2.
3.

No person shall smoke opium.
No person shall sell or deal or traffic in opium in any form suitable

for smoking.
No person shall prepare or manufacture opium in any fooo suitable
4.
for smoking.
5.
No person shall have in his possession order or disposition opium in
any form suitable for smoking. 10
Northrop Frye has argued in relation to the Authorized Version of 1611
that the numbering of verses enhances the monadic quality of each
fragment. 1l Like a shattered mirror, each shard of which equally reflects tbe
world, the verses of the Bible are each and all a gateway to the same holistic
truths. The terse discontinuity of the Bible paradoxically binds its sprawling
narrative together. In this simple Act, too, the enumeration does not detract
from the rhythmic insistency of the sections but rather enhances their

strength.
Poetry, for Frye, is also the language of command: "Let there be light";
"Thou shalt not kill". The democratic discursivity of prose seeks to persuade
163

and to cajole, but a poem is a declaration not an argument, an aphoristic form
which brooks no dissent. Are these early laws not likewise written in a
declaratory style which idealizes, as do the Ten Commandments, the etJect
of words upon behaviour? The brevity and absolute nature of these
provisions conveys this message. But consider also their tense. Like "'Thou
shalt not kill", "No person shall smoke opium" describes a future world
which is assumed to have become realized in the very making of the
enactment. Illegal conduct is not here countenanced: after the passage of this
Act, we are told, no person sball smoke opium. We tind the same style in
many other criminal laws of the time, all of which reflect the moral certitude
of the late Victorians, and their corresponding faith in the power and
effectiveness of the law.
Admittedly, not all the laws passed at this time are of the same tenor. The
first Canadian Act, for example, which dates from 1908, begins:
1. Every person is guilty of an indictable offence
and liable to imprisonment for three years, or to a
penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars and not les
than fifty dollars. or to both, who imports for other than
medicinaJ purposes '" any crude opium or powdered
opium, or who manufactures, sells,or offers for sale, or
bas in his possession for sale, for other than medicinal
purposes, any crude opium or powdered opium.
Unlike the previous example, we here begin with an assumption of
trespass. It is the wrong-doer who is the focus of the law and not the lawabiding citizen. There is undoubtedly a greater realism at work here, since
the law foreshadows a world in which the importation of opium for other
than medicinal purposes, although illegal, continues. Nonetheless, the law is
simple and to the point Indeed, for all its density it is shorter than the
Victorian Act. Structured as a threat and not a promise, it still conveys an
aura of straightforward certainty. It is this terseness and simplicity which
characterized the early opium laws around the world.
Over time, the beauty of simplicity, with all the legislative arrogance that
implied, has given way to a monumental complexity. In this change we can
witness the confidence of law-makers being replaced by a dogged
detenninatioD. The original Victorian legislation of six sections has
expanded to over one hundred, supplemented, moreover, by in excess of a
thousand regulations dealing with everything from the granting of licenses to
the format of medical prescriptions. In Canada, the Narcotic Control Act
remains a relatively modest 28 sections long, although the consolidation and
amendments proposed in Bill C-85 would bring the weight of Canadian law
in line witb that of other Commonwealth jurisdictions. At the same time, in
Canada or Australia, the U.S. or the U.K., the number of controlled drugs has
164
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expanded enormously. The original control of opium or opium suitable for
smoking was soon modified to include heroin, morphine, cocaine, and
ecgonine. But now the relevant drug schedule of any jurisdiction you care to
name includes close to 150 substances ranging from the common and the
garden to the most obscure products of the laboratory technician's art.I;!
This enormous growth reflects not only the extent to which these
substances are now attempted to be controlled in society, but the way in
which the law itself has become not just a means of declaring appropriate
behaviour but a way of supervising it. The law has changed its mood, from
imperative to indicative. But the increasing intrusion of the law into life
shows not its power but its failure. The consistent inability of bald and
simple laws to prevent 'drug abuse' has led, with manic desperation, to an
insistent and exponential increase in both the objects and detail of drug
control.

THE SEMIOTICS OF THE SHORT TITLE
The bureaucratization and intrusiveness of drug laws is one way in which
drug laws have been transfonned over the years, and we have only to listen
to the style and feel the weight of drug legislation to appreciate that a
profound change has taken place. It is the mood and tense of language in a
host of jurisdictions which reveals the extent of this change. Of even more
significance has been the shifting rhetoric used to explain the need for drug
control. Drugs have come to symbolize very different fears at different
times. 13
The very morphology_ of the titles of drug laws provides us with a
valuable snapshot of these historical currents and eddies. Indeed, it is
possible to construct a whole study of drug laws from the perspective of the
terminology used by and contained in them. These terminological changes,
which appeared natural at the time and yet are in a constant state of nux,
reveal through their unconscious and unmediated use of language the
changing values and priorities of the community. Law is a part of society, its
mirror as well as its mould, and its language is not that of a hermetically
sealed formalism. Let us consider, then, the short titles of drug legislation
around the world as a semiotic system which reveals the concerns and fears
of legislatures at different times - revelations found through carefully
evaluating those few words which, as talismans at the head and origin of
legislation, captured its approach to the problems which drug use presented.
What after all is a title but an attempt at suzerainty over meaning?14 On
the borderline between text and con-text, the title seeks to define in advance
the boundaries of meaning of the words contained within or beneath it. Like
a literary title, the title of an Act is not merely an administrative convenience;
as Eco writes, it "is already - and unfortunately - a key of
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interpretation" .15 The title in law or literature is therefore a nonnative and
interpretive argument which participates in the power struggle for the
legitimacy of its subject-matter. It attempts to justify - and no more clearly
or problematically than in the field of drug law - the use of force which lies
at the heart of all law, by insisting that the problem it addresses be looked at
and characterized in a certain way.
The concept of legal title defines a space of land in a particular fashion
and consequently engages in the power struggle for possesion of it. So too,
the short title defmes a social space in a particular fashion and similarly
claims legitimacy for a certain view of power relations. It tells us: this is how
a certain problem should be looked at. this is the way in which the social
event dealt with within this framework, should be defined and dealt with. A
short title is indeed like the frame of a painting - it organizes the space within
it a certain way and tells us where and how to look. But as Derrida
emphasizes, too, a picture frame is not neutraL 16 It purports to act as an
objective boundary between the relevant and the irrelevant: but there is
nothing objective about such a delineation. The picture frame and the short
title alike are part of the work as well as prior to it.

POISONS AND OPIUM
Let us excavate a semiotics of the short title in order to discern tlle
differing purposes which drug laws were meant to achieve from time to time;
purposes which showed, in their language, remarkable changes over time
and a striking similarity between jurisdictions. In titrating the potential of
this kind of approach, to show what it reveals of commonality and difference
in the comparative history of drug legislation, we begin by noting that the
fIrst laws dealing with the control of drugs were contained in Poisons Acts,
such as those of the United Kingdom and cognate legislation throughout the
Empire. They were, we may therefore presume, concerned with the dangers
of accidental or deliberate poisoning. 17 For most drugs, include opium and
morphine, minimal controls simply ensured that they were properly labelled,
so that people would not be killed by consuming them unknowingly. The
danger of a poison lies in ignorance. There was no attempt to control the
conscious use of these drugs, whether habitual, recreational, or otherwise.
Wilful (mis)use was not, as yet, problematic or corrupt.
As the thought that people might be poisoning themselves with these
substances became less important, other preoccupations began to develop,
and drug legislation was by and large removed from the province of the
Poisons Acts. IS There emerged instead Acts such as the Opium Act of 1895
in South Australia, An Act to prohibit the importation, manufacture and sale
of Opium for other than medicinal purposes - passed in 1908 in Canada and, about the same time, the international Opium Convention signed at The
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Hague in 1912. What these Acts have in common (the Opium Convention
less so) is a pre~occupation with one particular drug, opium. The reason for
this is not bard to find: it is because opium was associated with the Chinese,
a hated and alien minority in colonial countries such as Canada and
Australia. The Victorian legislation is even clearer. Its short title is the Opium
Smoking Prohibition Act, 1905. Why is this an Act about 'smoking' rather
than any other means of ingestion? - because the Chinese only smoked their
opium and only the Chinese did SO.19 The shift of emphasis from 'poison' to
'opium' is therefore significant It indicates a change in the kind of concern
which was driving the developing area of 'drug laws'. Drug laws are now
being driven by xenophobia.
For some time the focus on opium - that is, on the Chinese - continues
alongside an increasing interest in other drugs used for recreational purposes.
Thus in 1911 the Canadians pass An Act to prohibit the improper use of
Opium and other Drugs. Notice, then, the bifurcation between "opiwn" and
those "other drugs" which, although not opium (not taken by the Chinese)
are nonetheless worthy of control. Notice, too, the use of that word
"improper" which suggests that we are not concerned with the safety of
consumers, such as might be the brief of a "poisons" Act, but with their
propriety. In a way which was not true in relation to Poisons Acts, nor even
in relation to the Chinese smoking of opium, we have entered upon moral
legislation. Octavius Beale, an Australian Royal Commissioner of peculiar
fanaticism, wrote:
It is said that "yoacannot make people moral by Act of
Parliament." But that is precisely what you can do, and
it is the only way ... This doctrine of laisser-faire, of
unrestraint, [is] in diametrical antithesis to the Christian
philosophy, which we surely cannot be expected to
ignore. 2o

DANGER AND NARCOSIS
The rust comprehensive British legislation parallels this transitional
phase. Enacted in 1920, it was entitled An Act to regulate the Importation,
Exportation, Manufacture, Sale and Use of Opium and Other Dangerous
Drugs. But in the United Kingdom, without the experience of large-scale
Chinese migration, the question of opium was less important than elsewhere,
and the Act was known as the Dangerous Drugs Act 1920 (U.K.). But there
is another significant linguistic shift here. We are beginning to explore why
the uncontrolled consumption of drugs such as morphine, heroin, or cocaine
was deemed "improper". It is because they are "dangerous" that consumers
cannot be trusted with a free market. Legal control is justified not simply
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because of what the drug is or who takes it, as in the case of the "opium
smoking" laws, but because of their power. The use of the phrase "dangerous
drugs" to describe the objects of legislative control, tben, suggests an
expansion in the drugs covered by legislation, a rationale for that expansion,
and perhaps also a recognition of the need to develop such a rationale.
The vagueness of this rationale, since it says nothing about why certain
drugs were to be considered "dangerous", was undoubtedly another reason
for its utility for a time. It was a rubric commonly used: the relevant United
Kingdom legislation remained the Dangerous Drugs Act from 1920 until
1971; in South Australia the Dangerous Drugs Act was in force from 1934 to
1974; in Victoria the Dangerous Drugs Regulations, 1922 provided the meat
and substance of the legislation contained in the Poisons Acts; even in New
South Wales, the sections of the dragnet legislation called the Police
Offences Act dealing with drugs were commonly known as the "Dangerous
Drugs Laws"?l
Of course the implied assertion that these Acts were entitled to treat a
congeries of substances similarly because they were all "dangerous" begged
the question. Why did society respond to their apparent "danger by either
proscribing their use utterly (in the cases of opium for smoking and, later,
heroin and marijuana) or, more typically, permitting their consumption only
under medical supervision? Some justification was required which would
defme the issue of drug-taking as a medical problem rather than a social one.
It is for this reason that the use of the word "narcotics" comes to be
commonplace. First in Canada, where The Opium and Narcotic Drug Act
was enacted in 1929; it was re-enacted as the Narcotic Control Act (Can.)
from 1961. Then in the States of Australia, with Victoria leading the way,
defming all drugs covered by the relevant Part of the Poisons Act ,
1930 (Vic.) as "Narcotics". Later we find the Health (Narcotics) Act, 1956
(Vic.), the Commonwealth Narcotic Drugs Act, 1967 (Aust.) and the
Narcotic and Psychotropic Drugs Act 1970 (S.A.).
It is only in the 1970s, indeed, that tile term begins to lose its currency,
new priorities and concerns began to take shape. From the 1930s to the
1960s, the word "narcotics" was the standard general term used to cover
these substances. This was particularly noticeable and influential at the level
of the international community, where the Convention for Limiting the
Manufacture of and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs of 1931
exercised a powerful nonnative influence on national legislation. In 1946 the
Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium, the administrative body of the
League of Nations which oversaw the growing machinery of international
co-operation in this area was renamed, under the United Nations, the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs. In 1961 a new treaty consolidated and
replaced the previous dozen international agreements in the area. It was
7
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called the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
This kind of linguistic history is more difficult to trace in relation to the
United States, because of the unique traditions of that country, at once both
highly rationalist and highly individualist. The individualism has led to a
practice of naming important Bills for their authors, such as the Harrison Act
191422 which had the effect of prohibiting the use of heroin absolutely,
whether for medical purposes or otherwise. The rationalism has led to the
incorporation of various legislation, enacted at different times, into the
complex structure of the United States Code. Accordingly, the law relating
to illicit drug use is scattered throughout various Titles of the Code, some
parts contained, for example, in the Title dealing with "Food and Drugs" and
others under the rubric "The Public Health and Welfare". It is the
requirement that legislation conform to a set and pre-existing logical
structure which has lead to this fragmentation. Nonetheless, even here, we
may note that the relevant Part of Title 21 (Food and Drugs) of the 1946
Code dealt with "Narcotic Drugs", while that of 1952 contained, under
Public Health and Welfare, provisions concerning "Narcotic Addicts and
Other Drug Abusers". We might similarly recall that as early as the 1920s,
the Division of the Deparonent of the Treasury which investigated breaches
of the Harrison Act was restructured and renamed the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.
What is the effect of the use of placing this crucial word so visibly in the
short title of all these Acts and treaties? What message does it convey? It
implies that the substances previously identified only as "dangerous" are in
fact united in their medical and pharmacological nature as well as by their
legal status. There is a patina of scientific legitimacy attached to that central
word "narcotics". By using it. the title tells us to expect a certain kind of
scientific substance to be dealt with. The frame gives medical legitimacy to
the like treatment of the substances dealt with in the Act. Clearly this is
untrue: neither cocaine nor cannabis are narcotics (that is, sedative). By
categorizing them using a technical medical term, however, their legal
treatment was shored up with scientific authority, all the while underscoring
the belief that 'drug use' itself was a medical problem.
The word "narcotics", therefore, (a) gives the illusion that there is a
scientific basis to legal policy and, (b) presents the drug question as a
medical rather than a moral or a social issue. The word acts as a legitimation
and as a defence of government intervention. Here, then, we see the power
of the language of the title to construct a reality, to expropriate authority by
the use of persuasive words, and to redefme a social event - tIle
consumption of cannabis, for example - by placing it within a frame so that
it comes to be seen as scientifically dangerous and medically unjustifiable.
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MISUSE AND ABUSE
By the 1970s, however, the language of narcosis, with its emphasis on the
medical dangers of drug use, was no longer an adequate desc.,'ription and
justification of people's fears. The concern over drug use which began to
crystallize from about 1970 was a more general one. Admittedly this concern
was in part related to with the inc...Teasing non-medical or recreational use of
drugs - thus for example the Canadian government's Royal Conunission of
Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs, or the South Australian Royal
Commission which, six years later, bore exactly the same title; and indeed
the use of similiar language in academic scbolarship.z3 But it was the social
symbolism of non-medical use, that is, the way in which it had come to
represent non-comfonnity in general, which was seen £0 be particularly
alarming at that time. For in the light of drug controls which provided a
familiar framework of absolute medical power and potent legal sanctions,
illegal use challenged both medical sovereignty and legal authority alike.
Any illicit use, whether "dangerous" or "addictive" or not, whether of
"narcotics" or otherwise, was seen to constitute an affront to both the
established order and to professional power.
The language of the law mirrors this refinement. In 1970, that Part of
Title 21 of the U.S. Code which had previously dealt with "Narcotic Drugs"
became entitled the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. The next year
saw passage in the United Kingdom of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (U.K.).
So too we may note the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act, 1985 (N.S .W.) and
the Drug Misuse Act 1986 (Qld.). In the substantive provisions of many
other Acts there is likewise growing reference to those who "misuse" or
"abuse" drugs. '''Misuse'' and, even more so, "abuse", both return us to an
implication of impropriety based on legal and social norms as much as
medical ones. The drug user may not be suffering from any medical problem
but he or she is nevertheless "abusing" drugs and is therefore subject to the
rigours of the law.
In fact,, the power of this language comes exactly from the intentional
conflation pf 'use' with 'misuse' and 'abuse). Medically, it is possible to
simply "use" a drug (whether heroin or cannabis) without suffering hann.
But in the language of these laws, this fact is no longer relevant. The use of
the word "misuse" or "abuse" to cover any illegal consumption of controlled
drugs immediately taints the behaviour as deviant. Again, the short title, by
telling us what we can expect to fmd within the substantive provisions that
follow it, help persude us that anyone who breaks the law is in fact
"misusing" or "abusing" drugs. The language encourages us to characterise
certain kinds of behaviour in a certain way, and thus exerts a significant
normative force in the ostracism of (mis- or ab-) users.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (U.K.)
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which describes itself as "An Act to make new provision with respect to
dangerous or otherwise harmful drugs". Observe, therefore, that the rationale
for the law is no longer the fact that drugs are "dangerous". Some drugs are
not dangerous - not, therefore, a threat to the health of users - but remain
"otherwise harmful" - a threat to society instead. The Act goes on to define
its terms. "Misusing a drug", it explains placidly, means "misusing it by
taking if' .24 There is no such thing as taking it without misusing it. The effect
and purpose of the Act is to label all illegal drug use as misuse. It feneets a
concern in which it is no longer the medical aspects of drug use which are
seen as terrifying, but rather its place as a species of social deviancy or
pathology. In the United Kingdom and in other jurisdictions in which this
terminology is taken up, therefore, severe legislation is now justified because
the Acts in which it is contained do not simply deal with objects, that is with
drugs which are "dangerous" or "narcotic", but with their "misuse" Of
"abuse".

TRAFFIC
The power of the word "misuse" comes from the establishment of an
isomorphism between users and misusers, and its function is to focus all the
inappropriateness of the user's criminal rebellion rather than the dangers of
the drug per se. But it must be acknowledged that not all users were or are
equally blamed. Increasingly attention has been focused on those who sell
drugs: the pedlar, the distributor, and the trafficker. Indeed, through the
1970s and into the present day, it is the seller who does not use who becomes
a new image of evil. He is portrayed as a vulture who, unlike his clients,
remains in complete control of bis faculties and, in calculated fashion,
chooses to distribute dangerous and corrupting poisons. New legislation and
legislative amendments reflected this new priority. Courts had always, in
practice, been harsher on the trafficker than the mere user; in the 1960s, both
New South Wales and Victoria consolidated this practice into specific
legislative provisions establishing separate and more severe penalties for the
sale of controlled drugs.1.5 In 1980, the Australian Royal Commission on
Drugs recommended the development of a separate Drug Trafficking Act to
provide the police with the powers, provisions, and penalties necessary to
deal with 'the drug trade'.26 In all Australian jurisdictions there is now
separate and significantly harsher provision for those who traffic in illegal
drugs, or convicted of being in possession of a quantity of an illegal drug
deemed for the purposes of the Act to be "traffickable" (to which reverse
onus provisions apply).
And what of the language itself - the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act,
1985 (N.S.W.), the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1985 (U.K.), and the
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
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Substances 1988? Nowhere is the ability of the title to legitimate a reality
more evident. Compare, for example, the Victorian Act passed at the same
time, entitled the Drugs, Poisons, and Controlled Substances Act, 1981
(Vic.), which does not just deal with "drugs" but treats them in their context
as part of a broad family of "substances" such as "poisons". The language of
this Act does not set drugs apart from the rest of the world, but attempts to a
limited extent to normalize them and to strip them of their emotive
connotations. The Controlled Substances Act, 1984 (S.A.) is even more
pointed in this respect. The title of this Act, probably the most liberal
legislation to emerge from any comparable jurisdiction, makes a studied
effort at neutrality. We are not dealing with "drugs" - only with "substances"
of all sorts. Moreover, the title does not attempt to justify in any sense the
content of the Act. These substances are "controlled". In stark contrast to the
apparently objective but in fact value-laden titulation we have been noting,
no justification for this control is offered. Rather, the title emphasizes the fact
of legislative control and no more.
The word "traffic" has dramatically different connotations. In the fIrst
place, the .very word "t!affic" is loaded, echoing with images of the slave
trade or electoral bribery. To be involved in 'traffic' is already to engage in
something morally reprehensible and worthy of repression. The use of the
word itself justifies the measures taken in relation to it. Indeed, the word
'drug' also shares some of this notoriety. It is a word redolent of indolence
and somnolence, hedonism and heinous power. In the context of one hundred
years of hysteria, a "drug" "trafficking" Act both proclaims itself a response
to this fear, and does more than its fair share in promoting it.
More than this, however, a "trafficking Act" establishes the importance
of traffic as a subject deserving of special concentration. This is the short
title's function as a means of structuring reality, and it demonstrates the
normative power the law exerts over how we understand and construct the
world. The law defmes a particular social space - that occupied by the drug
trade - as opposed to the infinite other possible ways in which we might
defme relationships in the world. An Act about "traffic" prioritizes this kind
of drug-related behaviour as something which ought to be foregrounded and
the focus of legal attention: not the species of drugs used ("opium" and
"other"; although, admittedly, there is normally a distinction made between
"cannabis", for which less severe penalties are provided, and "other" drugs)
nor the kind of use ("medical" or "non-medical") nor the extent of use
("recreational" or "addictive") are held at this stage to be conclusive legal
categories. Rather the language of the law encourages us to make judgments
about people on the basis of the degree of their involvement in the drug
economy.
The New South Wales Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985, fo~
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example, provides different penalty regimes depending on whether the
amount of the drug in question was a "small quantity", a traffickable
quantity, an ~~indictable quantity" or a "commercial quantiti' .27 The law
establishes a moral taxonomy based principally on the amount of drugs
involved~ which is itself seen to reflect the economic status of the criminal.
Monetary and quantitive categories determine and structure our
understanding of the degree of wrong-doing, and validate the severity of the
law. Laws creat categories of thought, and in so doing they define, they set
apart, they accuse, and they blame.
The very focus on drugs as an economic problem indicated by the
priority of the language of "traffic" marks a significant shift in the priorities
of the law. By the 19805, it was the business of drugs which aroused people's
greatest anger and was used to justify the extreme severity of the law. Thus
Victorian M.L.A. Williams spoke in high rhetorical dudgeon of "multimillion dollar fmanders" who were "wicked men" and "evil monsters".
Likewise the Victorian Minister of Health, giving the second reading speech
of the Drugs Poisons and Controlled Substances Bill 1983, insisted that "the
new dimension of drug abuse was its promotion for profit, the involvement
of organized crime".28 The new symbol of evil was a businessman whose
wickedness stemmed from his respectability, his power and his wealth. As
the language of "traffic" demonstrates t the drug problem was no longer a
question of health or morality, but of economics and power.

CONCLUSION
In drug laws in particular, the brute force of the law is manifest. But this
power is sustained by the communal belief in its legitimacy, which is in tum
upheld by strategies of rhetoric, the manipulation of language and of reason.
It is exactly those argumentative strategies which we have seen the short title
deploy with great variety and with considerable effect. The semiotics of drug
legislation reveals with great clarity the range and changing focus of those
justificatory arguments, repeated in similiar fashion in a variety of countries.
At the same time, this approach has demonstrated the normative and
persuasive power which the framework erected by the law exerts through its
capacity to characterise the subject-matter of our lives. We have seen the
legislative voice trace (for us) and help determine (for them) a shifting reality
in which only the global decibelage and timbre of that voice has remained,
to a remarkable degree, constant.
It will do no good, therefore, to try and elaborate reasons for the
maintenance of current policy or, for that matter, to use logic to criticize it.
For it is not reason which is operative here. As we have seen, the reasons for
the continuing hostility of and severe penalties exacted by the law have
remained no more constant than the substantive laws themselves. 29 The
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constant anger which fmds expression in drug legislation has been pressed
into the seIVice of a range of causes and beliefs. But that only makes the
constancy of the anger in the face of changing historical circumstances all
the more puzzling. We must look beyond reason and argument and politics,
therefore, to the visceral and aesthetic symbolism of drugs in order to begin
to learn why - differently defmed, differently understood, but always
vilified - these substances have consistently generated a climate of fear and
virulent legislative reaction. What has remained constant through the
changing face of reason in all these jurisdictions has been the feelings of
revulsion or seduction, of dirt and purity, which images of drugs have always
provoked. It is this symbolism which we need to understand.
A single example suggests the directions in which this analysis, itself
broadly semiotic in nature, might develop. The Australian Royal
Commission of Inquiry into Drugs, chaired by Justice Sir Edward Williams,
and commissioned jointly by the States and Commonwealth of Australia,
was a document exhaustively researched and carefully compiled. Despite its
detail and length, however,. everything we need to know about this
Commission is to be found in the sixteen pages of colour plates at the front
of Book A.3D The fIrst picture is of a single opium poppy and the last, of a
cannabis plant. They are beautifully pbotographed, elegant simple, and lush.
Between these images of beauty lie maps of world drug production and
traffic routes, and page after page of photographs of the fruits of drug raids
and custom searches, crudely displayed and harshly lit. Sticks of hashish are
paraded alongside the dismantled radio in which they were found, sachets of
heroin next to the objects in which they were concealed, and so on. What do
these images communicate to us? They convey a message which emphasizes
the spirit of perverse inventiveness by which the drug trade is carried on. Yet
it is the drug itself which seems to be doing the hiding here. There are
without exception no people in these pictures, only objects: agents of
corruption and places of secretion. For Mr Justice Williams, the 'ldrug
prOblem'; is not a human problem at all, but simply about techniques of
importation, law enforcement, and the interdiction of chemicals. IllegalilY
and evasion constitute the sole focus of Justice Williams investigation.
And what of the only two living things in these pictures? Our reaction to
them is coloured by the harsh images which are their counterpoint. Our fast
reaction is perhaps to appreciate the beauty of the opium poppy, but by the
time we reach the cannabis plant, this beauty has become ironic. In the
context provided by the otber pictures, the natural beauty of these plants
seems seductive and deceptive. Papaver somniferum and cannabis sativa
may look harmless enough, but like a wanted poster, we are being wamed.
Theirs is a saccharine, cloying beauty, not of innocence but of depravity. It
is the beauty of the femme fatale.
I
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Through our aesthetic reactions and not our capacity to reason, these
images symbolize a world view and an argument. They tell us how to look
at drugs - bow to understand their beauty and how to resist their allure, what
aspects of the drug problem matter and what are to be ignored. All these
messages are conveyed simply through the operation of the visual, through a
semiotic system which effectively juxtaposes beauty and brutality. But the
images I have explored do not merely illustrate what beliefs are operative
bere; they are a powerful instrument in their construction. The design of the
colour plates for the Australian Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drugs was
neither a calculated manipulation of the emotions of the reader, nor a
coincidence. It reveals a response to the problem of drugs grounded in
aesthetic reactions. A revulsion to certain images, and a concept of beauty a~
purity, guided the Commission throughout the execution of its task. In the
imagery of the Royal Commission we can see that the constant hostility to
drugs is not driven by logic or ethics but by a certain aesthetic semiotics.
At this point, I have only suggested that the idea of drugs generates
complex aesthetic reactions of great symbolic importance, and provided, by
way of introduction, one example of how such an analysis might proceed. A
more specific and detailed analysis is called for. By focusing on the
symbolism of drugs, we may begin to explain the intensity of emotion Wllich
surrounds the question of drug use in society and of which the law is a clear
and constant reflection. And mowing what is really at stake, we may yet be
able to address the fears which drug use arouse: to shift the focus of drug
imagery from the seductive evil of the poppy's juice and the devious hidingplaces of corrupt traffickers, and instead to focus on the pained faces of those
who suffer because of the brutal drug legislation we insist upon imposing on
them.

NOTES
1 Customs Act, 1901-1979 (Cwth.), s.235~ Drugs Poisons and Controlled
Substances Act 1981-1983 (Vic.), s.71: Controlled Substances Act, 1984
(S.A.), 8.32(5); Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (N.S.W.), ss. 23(2).
24(2), 25(2) & 33; Drugs Misuse Act Amendment Act 1990 (Qld.): Drugs of
Dependence Act 1989 (A.C.T.), s.164)
2 Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C., 1985, s. 4. See R. Solomon & S. Usprich. "Canada's
Drug Laws", J. of Drug Issues 21 (1991), 17,

3

4

See D. Manderson, From Mr. Sin to Mr. Big -A History ofAustralian Drug
Laws (Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 1993). See also D. Musto, The
American Disease (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); V. Berridge
& G. Edwards, Opium and the People (London: St. Martin's Press. 1981).

B.S. Jackson, Semiotics and Legal Theory; R. Kevelson. "Semiotics and Methods

175

of Legal Inquiry". 61 Ind. LJ. (1985) 355; R. Kevelson. The Law as a
System of Signs (New York: Plenum Press, 1988).
5 Quoted in R. Benson, "The Semiotic Web of the Law", in R. Kevelson, ed., Law
and Semiotics, Volume 1 (New York: Plenum Press, 1987) at 42-43; and in
R. Benson, "How Judges Fool Themselves", in R. Kevelson. ed.. Law and
Semiotics, Volume 2 (New York: Plenum Press, 1988) at 39; and see U.
Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press, 1984).

6 See the critique oflegal semiotics in C. Douzinas and R. Warrington.
Postmodern Jurisprudence (London: Routledge, 1991), at 99·100.
7 R. Kevelson. ed., Law and Semiotics, vols. 1-3 (New York: Plenum Press. 1987-

9).
8 In general, see P. Goodrich, Reading the Lavv (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); P.
Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistlcs, Rhetoric and Legal
Analysis (Basingstoke, Hamps: Macmillan, 1987); P. Goodrich. Languages
of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicholson, 1990) .
9 For example, Aboriginals PIVtection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act,
1891 (Qld.); Opium Act, 1895 (S.A.); Opium Smoking Prohibition Act 1905
(Vic.); Sale of Opium Act 1908 (Can.).

10 Opium Smoking Prohibition Act 1905 (Vic.).

11 N. Frye, The Great Code: The Brble and Literalure (Toronto: Academic Press
Canada, 1982), 207-08.
12 For example, Prohibited Substances Control Act, Bill C-85 (Can.); Narcotic
Control Act (Can.), R.S.C., 1985. c. N~l ; Drugs, Poisons, and Controlled
Substances Act 1981-92 (Vic.); Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971 (U.K.); Drug
Traffic Offences Act 1986 (U.K.).
13 For Canada, see - S. Small, "Canadian Narcotics Legislation 1908-1923: A
Conflict Model Interpretation" Can. Rev. of Socio. & Anrhro. 6 (1969). 36:
R. Solomon and M. Green, "The First Century: The History of Non-medical
\ Opiate Use and Control Policies in Canada", Univ. West. Onto L. Rev. 20
, (1982), 307; PJ. Giffenet ai., Panic and Indifference: The Politics of
Canada's Drug Laws, A Study in the Sociology of Law (Ottawa: Canadian
Centre on Substance Abuse, 1991); for Australia, see - D. Manderson.
"The First Loss of Freedom: Early Opium Laws in Australia", Aust. Drug
and Alcohol Rev. 7 (1992),439; D. Manderson, ''Trends and Influences in
the History of Australian Drug Legislation" J. of Drug Issues 22 (1992).
507; D. Manderson, From Mr Sin to Mr Big: a History of Australian Drug
Laws (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1993); A. McCoy, Drug Traffic
(Sydney: Harper & Row, 1980); for the U.K., see - V. Berridge and G.
Edwards. Opium and the People (London: 5t Martin's Press, 1981): V.
Berridge, "War Conditions and Narcotics Control: The Passing of the
Defence of the Realm Act Regulation 40B" J. Social Policy 7 (1982), 285;
P. Morgan, liThe Legislation of Drug Laws: Economic Crisis and Social

176

Law/Text/Culture
Control" J. Drug Issues 8 (1978), 53; for the U.S.A., see - D. Musto. The
American Disease (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); R. Bonnie
and C. Whitebread. The Marihuana Conviction (Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia. 1974); J. Helmer, Drugs and Minority Oppression (New
York: Seabury Press. 1975); H. Morgan. Drugs in America -A Social
History 1800·1980 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1981); D.
Courtwright, Dark Paradise (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. 1982)
14 See N. Horn. "tityrus", LawlI'extlCulture 1 (1994); G. Genette. "Structure and
Function of the TItle in Literature", Critical Inquhy 14 (1988). 692: J.
Derrida, "TITLE: To be specified", Sub-stance 31 (1988),5.
15 Quoted in Genette, supra note 14. at 719.
16 J. Derrida. trans. G. Bennington & 1. McLeod,The Truth in Painting (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1987).
17 Sale ofPoisons Act, 1852 (U.K.); Sale and Use of Poisons Act 1876 (N.S.W.).
Sale and Use of Poisons Act 1876 (Vic.).
18 The one solitary exception was in Victoria, where drug laws remained as part of
the Poisons Act until as late as 1981: see for example the Poisons Act, 1915
(Vic.), the Poisons Act, 1962 (Vic.) and the Poisons (Drugs ofAddiction)
Act, 1976. In New South Wales, drug laws were transferred back to the
Poisons Act, 1966 but relocated again in 1985: see Poisons Act, 1966
(NSW) and Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act, 1985 (NSW).
19 See Manderson, supra note 13; Helmer. supra note 13; Green, supra note 13; N.
Boyd, "The Origin of Canadian Narcotics Legislation", Dalhousie L.J. 8
(1984), 102.

20 Conunonwealth of Australia, Royal Commission Into Secret Drugs, Cures, and
Foods (0. Beale, Commissioner) (Melbourne: Government Printer, 19(7),
26,418.
21 See Police Offences Amendment (Drugs) Act, 1927 (N.S.W.) and its successors.
22 United States Code. ntle 26.
23 Government of Canada, Commission ofInquiry into the Non-medical Use of
Drugs, Final Report (G. Le Dain, Chair) (Ottawa: Government Printer.
1973) South Australia, Final Report afthe Royal Commission into the Nonmedical Use of Drugs, South Australia (R. Sackville. Chair) (Adelaide:
Gillingham Printers,1979): and see for example R. Solomon. & T. Madison.
"The Evolution of Non-Medical Opiate Use in Canada - Part 1 1870-1929",
Drug Forum 5(3) (1976-77), 237-65; R. Solomon, "The Evolution of NonMedical Opiate Use in Canada - Part 2: 1930-1970", Drug Forum 6(1)
(1977-78), 1-25.
24 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (UK), s. 37(2).
25 Poisons Act, 1962 (Vic.), ss. 32 & 34(2); Poisons Act 1966 (NSW),
Poisons (Amendment) Act 1970 (NSW), 5S. 21 & 45a.

SS.

21 & 32:

26 Commonwealth and States of Australia, Australian Royal Commission of Inquiry
Into Drugs, Books A-F (Sir Edward Williams. Commissioner) (Canberra:

177

Aust. Gavt. Publishing Service. 1980). Book E

27 Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (N.S.W.), ss.29. 30-33. I use the term
"traffickable quantity" analogously with the language of other JurisdIctions
on the basis of the deeming provLsIOns of s.29.

28 Victorzan Parliamentary Debates, Session 1982-83, 3531~32: Victorian
Parliamentary Debates, Session 1983-84,2113; Victorian Parllamentary
Debates Session 1983~84, 5294.
29 See also J. Himmelstein, "From Killer Weed to Drop-out Drug". Contemporary
Crises 7 (1983), 13-38.
30 Commonwealth and States of Australia, supra note 26, foLlowmg page xx.

178

